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Effects of Regulation on Efficiency of Grain Marketing
by Lowell D. Hill*
I. INTRODUCTION
Increased efficiency in agriculture is frequently circumscribed by rules
and regulations which control and organize production and marketing
systems.' These rules of the game- legal, cultural, and ethical rules-
generate incentives as well as place restrictions on the performance of the
industry.2 Regulations determine incentives, incentives direct decisions
of private firms and the conjunction of these numerous private decisions
set the performance characteristics of the market. Performance criteria,
such as efficiency and an adequate supply of food, are linked directly to
the policies and regulations established by government. "Overall, the
most severe shocks to the global food system have been manmade [i.e.,
government decisions] and are avoidable."3 An understanding of the re-
lationships between economic efficiency and the policies and regulations
of public agencies is necessary to provide guidance for public decisions
and private action.
The relationship between regulation and performance in the grain
industry is the primary focus of this article. Cereal grain4 is the major
source of sustenance for a majority of the world's population, accounting
for about thirty-five percent of total calories consumed worldwide.5 Be-
cause of the large volume involved, even minute increases or decreases in
* L.J. Norton Professor of Agricultural Economics, University of Illinois (1977 to present);
author of over 300 articles on grain marketing, grading and transportation.
The Author would like to express appreciation to a team of research assistants whose diligent
work provided much of the data and documentation for this article: Jeanne Bailey, Dixie Jackson,
Gabriel Serrano, Julie King, Liana Cuffman, Robert Spangler and Terry Kuhn.
I Schultz, Markets; Agriculture and Inflation, in ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN A MARKET
ECONOMY 67 (L. Hill ed. 1982).
2 Gardner, Macroeconomic Policies and Agricultural Programs, in ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN
A MARKET ECONOMY 100 (L. Hill ed. 1982).
3 Donaldson, Food Security and the Role of the Grain Trade, 66 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 193
(May 1984).
4 Grain is interpreted broadly in this paper to include soybeans. However, the term cereal
grains excludes oil crops such as soybeans, rapeseed and sunflowers. The major cereal grains used
for food and feed in world markets are wheat, corn, oats, barley, rye, and grain sorghum.
5 L. HILL & A. MUSTARD, Economic Considerations in Industrial Utilization of Cereals, in
CEREALS: A RENEWABLE RESOURCE 25 (1981).
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production and marketing efficiency can have major impacts on world
food supplies and the general welfare of individuals and nations.
II. THE REGULATION OF GRAIN MARKETING DECISIONS
Grain marketing decisions of farmers, merchandisers and interna-
tional traders are shaped by a wide range of regulations. Some policies
are very general in nature. For example price support programs in the
United States6 and the European Community (EC)7 influence farmers'
storage and marketing decisions. Other regulations are quite specific.
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), for example, under the
authority of the U.S. Grain Standards Act,' specifies the brand of mois-
ture meter acceptable for determining grain grades.9
Within the United States, state government regulations provide
much of the institutional and regulatory environment for grain market-
ing. Many of the regulations relate to the operation of grain warehouses.
Typical statutory schemesI° require warehouses to be licensed,1"
bonded z and insured 3 and often include detailed provisons dictating the
form of warehouse receipts.14
The forms and terms of contracts under which grain is traded in the
United States are also regulated by state provisions. For example,
delayed pricing" is a marketing tool frequently used by U.S. farmers to
retain the opportunity for price speculation without the responsibility of
6 GRAIN MARKETING ECONOMICS 266-72 (G. Cramer & W. Heid eds. 1983) [hereinafter cited
as Cramer & Heid].
7 P. Noyrez, The French Grain Storage Industry: An Evaluation of Price Performance Over
Time for Selected Grains in France 42-45 (1980) (unpublished M.S. thesis from University of Illinios
at Urbana-Champaign).
8 U.S. Grain Standards Act, 7 U.S.C. § 71 (1982).
9 Hunt & Neustadt, Factors Affecting the Precision of Moisture Measurement in Grain and Re-
lated Crops, 49 J. Ass'N OFFICIAL ANALYTICAL CHEMISTS 757 (1966).
10 See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 114, § 214 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 60-02 (1983); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 926 (Page Supp. 1983). See also GRAIN ELEVATORS TASK FORCE, U.S. DEP'T
OF AGRICULTURE, REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE 6-9 (Aug. 18, 1981).
II See, eg. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 114 §§ 214, 214.3, 214.4 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 60-02,
60-02-07 (1983).
12 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 114, §§ 214, 214.8 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 60-02, 60-02-09
(1983).
13 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 114 §§ 214, 214.13 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 60-02, 60-02-35
(1983).
14 N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 60-02, 60-02-16-3 (1983). A warehouse receipt is a certificate of title
that the farmer receives for stored grain from the warehouseman and it is administered under federal
or state warehouse laws.
15 Delayed pricing is a marketing technique used by farmers and country elevators. A delayed
price contract permits the seller to establish the price of the grain after ownership of the grain has
been transferred to the buyer.
Vol. 17:389
EFFECTS OF REGULATION
storing and maintaining quality.' 6 Misuse of delayed pricing has some-
times been associated with financial failure of country elevators and sub-
sequent financial loss to farmers. 7 As a result, delayed price is regulated
by statute in the major grain producing states. 8
At the federal level, many legislative and regulatory actions affect
the performance of the domestic and export markets. For example, the
U.S. Grain Standards Act of 191611 eliminated many of the inefficiencies
resulting from the frequent arbitrations required to settle disputes over
quality when grading and standards were at the discretion of individual
boards of trade, grain exchanges, chambers of commerce and state agen-
cies. 0 The provisions of the 1916 Act authorize the Secretary of Agri-
culture to develop standards for grain2' and specify that all export grain
must be graded by official inspection personnel under these standards.
22
The development of uniform national standards decreased the cost of
marketing and the ensuing welfare gains were distributed between farm-
ers and consumers.23
Federal laws also influence the efficiency in transportation of grain
in the United States. Article IV of The Northwest Ordinance of 1787
stated that "the navigable waters leading into the Mississippi . . shall
be common highways and forever free. . . without any impost or duty
therefor. '' 24 Implementation of this principle obviously reduced the cost
of barge transportation, since waterways were maintained with public
funds.25 Passage of the Inland Waterway Revenue Act of 197826 re-
versed this principle by requiring barge companies to pay user fees to
cover part of the cost of the waterways in the form of a tax on diesel
fuel.2 7 The increased taxes were reflected in higher rates, shifting grain
16 ECONOMICS RESEARCH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, REPORT No. 320,
FARMER'S USE OF FORWARD CONTRACTS AND FUTURES MARKETS 4 (1976).
17 GRAIN ELEVATORS TASK FORCE,.supra note 10, at 49-51.
18 N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 60-02, 60-02-19.1 (1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 926, 926.29
(Page Supp. 1983).
19 Grain Standards Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-190, 39 Stat. 982 (1917) (current version at 7
U.S.C. § 71 (1982)).
20 Address by J. Shanahan, National Grain Dealers Association, Des Moines, Iowa (Oct.
1901).
21 Grain Standards Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 71, 76 (1982).
22 Id §§ 71, 79(a).
23 Bailey, Standardizing and Grading Grain in the United States, 49 BULL. PAN-Am. UNION
400, 414 (1919).
24 DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 131 (H. Commager ed. 1963).
25 W. HULL & R. HULL, THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE WATERWAYS POLICY OF
THE UNITED STATES 9-10 (1967).
26 Inland Waterway Revenue Act of 1978, 26 U.S.C. § 4042 (1982).
27 Id. §§ 4042, 4042(a).
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traffic to other modes and reducing grain prices to farmers.28
The efficiency of grain marketing has also been affected by the exist-
ence and enforcement of antitrust legislation in the United States. Large
traders within the grain industry are quite sensitive to their potential lia-
bility and attempt to avoid actions that might be construed as violations
of these laws, even at the expense of profit or efficiency opportunities.29
Some segments of the grain industry enjoy a limited immunity from anti-
trust legislation. The Capper-Volstead Act of 192230 allows farmer coop-
eratives to be more competitive with other marketing firms by limiting
the antitrust liability of farmer owned cooperatives. The result is a shift
in the balance of power among firms and an alteration in the structure
and performance of the industry.31 The Export Trading Company Act of
1982 also limits the antitrust liability of companies in the grain trade.32
The goal of the Trading Act, to tap the export potential of U.S. busi-
nesses and to expand export markets, is facilitated in part by encouraging
the formation and operation of export trading companies and associa-
tions. A certification process is available to these companies through
which they may obtain exemption from potential antitrust liability relat-
ing to the pricing and marketing activities described in the certificate.
After a certificate is obtained, few legal barriers to export should re-
main.33 Antitrust legislation and regulation has both increased and de-
creased marketing efficiency.
Not all regulations have resulted in increased efficiency and, of
course, some regulations have welfare objectives that conflict with eco-
nomic efficiency. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA)34 enforces regulations to protect the health and safety of work-
ers in grain elevators.35 In general, these regulations have increased costs
and reduced efficiency in elevator operations. 36 A study conducted by
the Midwest Research Institute shows that enforcement of the OSHA
standard on dust control in grain elevators would result in annual recur-
28 D. Conley & L. Hill, Impact of Waterway User Fees on Illinois Agriculture 1 (Dep't of
Agricultural Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, No. AE-4527, Mar. 1982).
29 Miller & Nelson, Relationship Between the Grain Processing Industries and the Federal Anti-
trust Laws, in MARKETING GRAIN: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NCM-30 GRAIN MARKETING SYMPO-
SIUM 355-76 (Purdue University, Jan. 1968).
30 Co-operative Marketing Association (Capper-Volstead) Act, 7 U.S.C. § 451 (1982).
31 Manchester, Agricultural Marketing Cooperatives and Antitrust Law, in ANTTrRusT TREAT-
MENT OF AGRICULTURAL MARKETING COOPERATIVES 8-54 (E. Jesse ed. 1983).
32 Export Trading Company Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C.A. § 4001 (West Supp. 1983).
33 B. JONES & M. ANDERSON, THE SOUTHERN STATES AND EXPORT TRADE LEGISLATION 5
(Council of State Governments, 1983).
34 Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1982).
35 The term grain elevator is used to mean the firm as well as the physical facilities that receive,
store, dry, and ship grain in U.S. and foreign countries.
36 Hubbard, OSHA Dust Standard is No Safety Guarantee, CARGILL BULL., Feb. 1983, at 2.
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ring costs of $269,488,000 during the first ten years of the program. 7
However, society (or the political reflection of society's preference func-
tion) has determined that worker safety justifies the additional costs.
U.S. policies and farm programs to support farm prices and income
illustrate an important but indirect influence on performance in the grain
markets. U.S. export subsidies on wheat provided by the Agricultural
Act of 19701 were intended to support prices paid to farmers while keep-
ing export prices low enough to be competitive on the world market.
However, these subsidies effectively insulated foreign buyers from rising
prices caused by increased export sales.39 Consequently, large purchases
of grain by the USSR 4° in 1972 raised domestic prices but not export
prices. The use of U.S. tax dollars to lower prices to the USSR raised a
public outcrya" that resulted in new regulations requiring U.S. exporters
to report all future grain sales in excess of 50,000 tons to the export sales
agency of the USDA.42
The suspension of sales to the USSR in January, 1980, was a polit-
ical decision whose legal and moral enforcement generated inefficiencies
in trading patterns and distortions in price relationships.43 "In the Rus-
sian grain embargo, Canada, the European Community nations and Aus-
tralia agreed not to increase their exports to the Soviet Union. The
Soviet Union redirected its trade to Argentina, thus increasing the Ar-
gentine feed grain price."'  The change in relative prices altered the ori-
gin-destination patterns of world trade. Countries not supporting the
embargo increased sales to the USSR and decreased sales to Western
Europe. Conversely, countries supporting the embargo shifted sales from
USSR to Western Europe,4" often increasing transport costs and reduc-
ing efficiency relative to the previously established grain flow patterns.
46
Trade associations as well as government agencies generate regula-
tions that govern members of the grain industry in domestic markets. In
37 G.E.M. Consultants Inc., Evaluation of the Proposed OSHA Standard for Grain Handling
Facilities 73 (May 30, 1984), reprinted in OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HArLTH ADMIN., U.S.
DEP 'T OF LABOR, DOCKET H No. 117 (June 8, 1984).
38 Agricultural Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-524, 84 Stat. 1358 (1971).
39 D. MORGAN, MERCHANTS OF GRAIN 135 (1979).
40 Id at 210.
41 Id. at 172.
42 Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-86, § 812, 87 Stat. 221,
238 (1973).
43 A. WEBB, PROTECTION IN AGRICULTURAL MARKETS 19 (U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, ERS
Staff Report No. AGES 840524, Sept. 1984).
44 B. English, R. Schatzer, R. Roberts & E. Heady, Potential Long-Term Agricultural Impacts
of the Russian Grain Embargo 6 (The Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa State
University, Report No. 97, Apr. 1971).
45 ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, CORN: BACKGROUND FOR
1985 FARM LEGISLATION 14 (Sept. 1984) [hereinafter cited as CORN].
4 B. English, R. Schatzer, R. Roberts & E. Heady, supra note 44, at 6.
19851
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L LV
the United States, The National Grain and Feed Association has a sys-
tem for trade arbitration that dates back to 1901, providing "the machin-
ery for compulsory arbitration of trade disputes between members.
Arbitration is based on the National's Trade Rules which are commonly
accepted in the making of contracts."'4 The trading rules adopted in
1902 govern all disputes of a financial, mercantile or commercial charac-
ter connected with grain. "Arbitration under these rules is compulsory
among members and contributes to the orderly marketing of grain, feed
and their by-products."4 Efficiency in marketing is encouraged by rules
that permit the purchase and sale of "enormous volumes of grain and
feedstuffs . . . largely on the basis of mutual trust."'49
Other countries have regulations which are similar in many respects
to those of the United States. All major importing and exporting coun-
tries operate under some form of grading standards to facilitate efficient
trading by descriptive contracts.50  Argentina,5 1 South Africa, 52 and
Canada 3 have numerical standards and multiple factor grades similar to
those of the United States. The USSR publishes standards for each grain
that are more descriptive than numerical and vary depending on the use
of the grain.5 4 The Canadian Wheat Board not only establishes wheat
standards but also buys and sells all export wheat, sets producer prices
and storage rates, and negotiates export contracts with foreign buyers.5
Transportation policies of grain exporting countries influence the
cost of transportation and the efficiency with which grain is marketed
and delivered to the port. Canadian policy dating back to 1897 regulates
rates for moving grain to port elevators under a regulation known as the
Crows Nest Pass Act.5 6 A study of the economic effects of these rail
rates concluded that under the government rate regulation railroads were
47 1979-1980 DIRECTORY-YEARBOOK OF THE NATIONAL GRAIN & FEED ASS'N 15 [hereinaf-
ter cited as 1979-1980 DIRECTORY].
48 Cf Bloem, Avoiding and Resolving Trade Disputes--An Overview, in A GRAIN MERCHANT'S
GUIDE TO AVOIDING TRADE DISPUTES 10-11 (1982).
49 See 1979-1980 DIRECTORY, supra note 47, at 204.
50 Shellenberger, Development of an International Grain Quality Certificate, in PROCEEDINGS
7TH WORLD CEREAL AND BREAD CONGRESS 431 (1982).
51 JUNTA NATIONAL DE GRANOS, NUEVAS NORMAS PARA LA CLASIFICACION DE SORGO Y
MAIZ (1982) (Resolucion "J.N.G." No. 20.275) [hereinafter cited as Resolucion No. 20.275].
52 Regulations for Regulating the Requirements in Connection with the Export of Maize from
the Republic of South Africa, No. R 1070 (June 17, 1977).
53 CANADIAN GRAIN COMMISSION, GRAIN GRADING HANDBOOK FOR EASTERN CANADA
(Aug. 1980).
54 STATE STANDARDS OF THE USSR, GRAIN AND PULSE CROPS (V. Kothekar trans. 1974)
(published for U.S. Dep't of Agriculture).
55 CANADIAN INTERNATIONAL GRAINS INSTITUTE, GRAINS AND OILSEEDS-HANDLING,
MARKETING, PROCESSING 30-31 (2d ed. 1975).
56 Crow's Nest Pass Act of 1897, ch. 5, §§ 1(c), 1(e) 1896-1898 Can. Stat. 59.
394 Vol. 17:389
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forced to operate at a loss in moving grain to export points.5 7 The au-
thors predicted that unless the rate regulations on railroads were altered
the system would degenerate into "an even less efficient and capable rail
operation than we have presently."
5 8
Nationalization of the Argentine railway system in 194659 did not
resolve problems of inefficient grain transportation. Six different lines
were incorporated into the railroad system and the three different gauges
of track limited the interchangeability of equipment.' Average operat-
ing speeds of 6.25 miles per hour, car shortages and inefficient box car
design also reduced efficiency. 61 Regulations in the barge industry cre-
ated additional inefficiencies. "A regulation that requires a minimum
number of laborers on board has tended to make barges more costly than
they would be otherwise."'62
Export policies and domestic support prices are frequently used by
many countries to stimulate exports and production and to bolster farm
income.63 The effects on market performance are not always consistent
with the policy objectives. For example, price and export strategies for
soybeans were instituted by Brazil to encourage production and increase
their share of world soybean markets. 64 However, an analysis of Brazil-
ian policies by Williams and Thompson65 demonstrated that government
intervention in the Brazilian soybean industry generally benefited the
United States rather than Brazil. "The policies boosted world prices of
soybeans while lowering those of soybean products. Production, use and
exports of soybeans and products in the United States were all larger as a
consequence."
66
Support prices in the European Community (EC)67 and their system
57 D. HARVEY, CHRiSmAs TURKEY OR PRAIRIE VULTURE? AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
THE CRow's NESr PASS GRAIN RATES 2 (1980).
5S Ia at 76.
59 S. CHIANG & 0. BLAUH, ARGENTINA'S GRAIN MARKETING SYSTEM 13 (U.S. Dep't of
Agriculture, Report No. AGES 830916, Nov. 1983).
60 Id at 13.
61 Id. at 15-16.
62 Id. at 19.
63 C. JABARA & A. BRIGIDA, VARIABLE LEVIES: BARRIERS TO GRAIN IMPORTS IN FRANCE,
THE NETHERLANDS, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, AND UNITED KINGDOM 2 (U.S. Dep't of
Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Economic Report No. 156, Mar. 1980).
64 M. Schultz, Effects of Government Actions on Pricing Efficiency in the Brazilian Soybean
Market 5-6 (1983) (unpublished thesis from University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign).
65 Williams & Thompson, Brazilian Soybean Policy: The International Effects of Intervention,
66 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 497 (Nov. 1984).
66 Id. at 498.
67 The European Community was founded by the Treaty of Rome, signed by Belgium, France,
Italy, Luxemborg, the Netherlands, and West Germany. It became effective on January 1, 1958.
The United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland joined the Community on January 1, 1973.
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of variable levies6" have generated large surplus stocks of several com-
modities that require public expenditures to pay storage costs. 69 For ex-
ample, under the Treaty of Rome,7° the EC established a set of grain
trade regulations as part of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in
1962.71 The purpose of the CAP was to increase EC agricultural produc-
tivity while simultaneously providing EC farmers with an income level
equal to that of the non-farm sector.72 In order to accomplish these
goals, two trade mechanisms were established. 73 The first mechanism is
a grain pricing system that raises EC grain market prices above their free
market levels74 using a system of target and intervention prices.75 The
target price "reflects the market price which the EC feels farmers should
get for their grain."' 76 The intervention price is a floor price at which the
EC government must buy all the grain offered.77
The second trade mechanism involves a threshold price and a varia-
ble levy. "The threshold price is the minimum price at which grain im-
ports are permitted to enter EC markets. '7 The threshold price deters
the "much more competitively priced non-EC grain" from flooding the
EC market and consequently displacing the EC domestic grain sales.7 9
A variable levy is applied to all grain imports from countries outside the
ECs° in order to raise the price of any imported grain above the guaran-
teed price of the identical, EC produced commodity."
Although the pricing system and the variable levy have both in-
creased EC grain production and supplemented farm income, the EC
CAP causes several negative side effects.8 2 Inter-EC problems caused by
68 A variable levy is a variable tax used by the European Community to stabilize prices for
producers in member countries and also limit the impacts of variations in world prices. It is the
difference between the EC threshold price and the world price.
69 COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, GRAIN MARKETING SYSTEMS IN AR-
GENTINA, AUSTRALIA, CANADA AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY; SOYBEAN MARKETING SYS-
TEM IN BRAZIL 54 (May 28, 1976) [hereinafter cited as GRAIN MARKETING SYSTEMS].
70 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3.
71 H. McNrrr, THE EC MARKET FOR U.S. AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS: A SHARE ANALYSIS 3
(U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Economic Report No. 179, Mar. 1983).
72 FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, FOREIGN AGRICUL-
TURE CIRCULAR: GRAINS 2 (Dec. 11, 1981) [hereinafter cited as FOREIGN AGRICULTURE
CIRCULAR].
73 C. JABARA & A. BRIGIDA, supra note 63, at 2.
74 Id.
75 Id
76 FOREIGN AGRICULTURE CIRCULAR, supra note 72, at 5.
77 Id. at 6.
78 C. JABARA & A. BRIGIDA, supra note 63, at 4.
79 FOREIGN AGRICULTURE CIRCULAR, supra note 72, at 6.
80 C. JABARA & A. BRIGIDA, supra note 63, at 4.
81 H. McNrrr, supra note 71, at 11.
82 Id at 3, 11.
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the CAP include expensive farm surpluses and escalated food prices for
the EC consumer.8 3 Not only does the CAP pricing system transfer ex-
tra costs to the consumer, but it also presents the EC governments with
the expense of maintaining the price supports that encourage the domes-
tic production. 4 Inefficient use of resources is another problem caused
by the CAP. The incentive is to grow those crops for which prices are
supported above equilibrium levels. Consequently, large surpluses of cer-
tain crops accumulate, 5 while other crops not receiving a subsidy are in
short supply.
The CAP causes problems outside of the EC as well. The variable
levy is largely responsible for the steadily decreasing level of U.S. exports
to the EC.86 Not only do the threshold prices and variable levies reduce
U.S. exports into the EC, but the CAP support prices have generated
such an increase in EC grain production that the EC was a net exporter
of total grains for the first time in 1980."7 The EC has already exercised
its newly attained status as an exporter, displacing grain exports from
Argentina, Australia, Canada and the United States.88 Returning the
major food producing nations to a more rational and efficient use of re-
sources will require major revisions in trade and production policies of
the EC and other nations.
In addition to the rules and regulations governing marketing activi-
ties within individual countries, many trade regulations and policies have
consequences which extend beyond national borders. The cost of mar-
keting grain is dramatically reduced by the enforcement of contracts in
domestic and foreign trade, permitting the purchase or sale of millions of
bushels with no more than a phone call.89 Standardized contracts devel-
oped by organizations such as The Grain and Feed Trade Association of
London (GAFTA) also simplify transactions and reduce the cost of ex-
changes of title. Such contracts are very detailed and attempt to cover all
possible contingencies, and are used by all major grain importing and
exporting countries. Despite these attempts to avoid misunderstand-
ings, contract disputes do occur. When this happens, an agreement to
submit to arbitration can speed resolution. The 1958 United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
83 AGRICULTURE COUNCIL OF AMERICA, U.S. FARM EXPORT EDUCATION PROJECT, U.S.
FARM EXPORT STRATEGIES FOR THE EIGIMES 159 (Feb. 1981) [hereinafter cited as U.S. FARM
EXPORT STRATEGIES].
84 GRAIN MARKETING SYSTEMS, supra note 69, at 50.
85 H. McNrrr, supra note 71, at i.
86 H. McNrrr, supra note 71, at 12.
87 FOREIGN AGRICULTURE CIRCULAR, supra note 72, at 2.
88 Id.
89 D. MORGAN, supra note 39, at 64.
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Awards9" has aided in the enforcement of arbitration awards in the in-
ternational grain trade. Courts of most major grain trading nations re-
spect contractual obligations for arbitration and arbitration conditions
are generally included in these contracts. U.S. courts are favorably dis-
posed to recognize such agreements and once it is determined that a valid
contract containing a valid arbitration clause exists, the agreement can-
not be easily revoked.91 Only if the arbiters "deliberately disregarded
what they knew to be the law in order to reach the result they did"92 can
the agreement be vacated.93 Clauses stipulating that disputes be resolved
pursuant to the law of a given jurisdiction are generally honored. Time
and money of both the litigants and arbitors is conserved by the consoli-
dation of related proceedings of commodity and maritime cases which
deal with common facts and issues.94 U.S. courts may compel consolida-
tion "if the issues [in the several arbitrations] are substantially the same
and if no substantial right is prejudiced." 95 Standardized contracts and
organized markets, combined with the current regulatory climate, pro-
duce a system whose performance closely approximates that of the theo-
retical perfect market in terms of pricing efficiency and responsiveness to
incentives.96
World War I was a major stimulus for agricultural trade between
the U.S. and Europe. However, the increased trade only lasted until the
armistice and the subsequent recovery of European agriculture greatly
reduced U.S. agricultural exports. 97 Without export markets to absorb
surplus production, U.S. farmers "called for higher tariffs against foreign
imports." This demand for import restrictions prompted Congress to en-
act the Hawley-Smoot Tariff in 1930, which generated some of the high-
est tariffs in U.S. history.98 Although the tariffs successfully limited U.S.
imports, it became apparent that international markets were important
for the growth of U.S. agricultural trade and for the expansion of mar-
90 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done June 10,
1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (1970)).
91 See, eg., In re Ferrara S.P.A., 441 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
92 A. SLABOTzKY, GRAIN CONTRACTS AND ARBITRATION FOR SHIPMENTS FROM THE
UNITED STATES AND CANADA 99 (1984) (citing U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York, 82 Civ. 1302 (PNL)).
93 Id.
94 See, eg., A. SLABOTZKY, supra note 92, at 94 (citing U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York, 82 Civ. 2886 CSH). See generally id. at 83-102.
95 M. DOMKE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 272 (1968), quoted
in A. SLABOTZKY, supra note 92, at 92.
96 S. THOMPSON & R. DAHL, THE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF THE U.S. GRAIN EXPORT
INDuSTRY 3 (Agricultural Experiment Station, University of Minnesota, Technical Bull. 325, 1979).
97 Cramer & Heid, supra note 6, at 280.
98 Id.
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kets for grain farmers. Federal legislation was needed to re-open foreign
markets that had been restricted by high U.S. tariffs.
The Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 193411 emphasized the im-
portance of world markets for U.S. products and fostered several new
marketing strategies. One of the most important elements of the Act was
the authorization of bilateral trade agreements."co Trade agreements
with over thirty countries opened new markets and provided the condi-
tions necessary for expanded trade.01
Continued concern over trade barriers stimulated development of an
international agreement to move the participating nations toward freer
trade.102 The resulting document, the Charter for the International
Trade Organization (ITO), was never ratified. Instead, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)103 replaced the ITO as an in-
ternational agreement for the conduct of trade: "The provisions of
GATT include: unconditional most-favored-nation treatment of member
nations, 1" no quantitative restrictions,10 5 free transit of goods,10 6 equal-
ity of internal taxation of imported and domestic goods, 0 7 simplification
of custom procedures,0 8 and periodic examination of members'
subsidies."109
Although the provisions of the GAT should greatly reduce inter-
national agricultural trade barriers, several policy problems restrict its
effectiveness. The first is the lack of power to enforce agreements. There
are only two punitive courses of action available under the GATT: (1)
bring public opinion to bear on the offending country,110 or (2) permit
the plaintiff country to retaliate through the imposition of its own trade
barriers. 1 A second problem is that GATT membership does not in-
clude most of the centrally planned and less developed countries. Unfor-
tunately, these two particular groups have expanded their agricultural
trade most rapidly. Because these countries are not members of the
GATT, a major portion of world agricultural trade can neither benefit
99 Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 1934, 19 U.S.C. § 1351 (1982).
100 A bilateral trade agreement is an agreement between an exporting and an importing coun-
try to purchase or sell a certain amount of products per year.
101 Cramer & Heid, supra note 6, at 281.
102 Id.
103 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter cited as GATT].
104 Id. at art. I.
105 Id. at art. XI.
106 Id. at art. V.
107 Id. at art. III.
10 Id. at art. VII.
109 Id. at art. XVI.
110 A. WEBB, supra note 43, at 34.
111 Id.
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from nor be restricted by the provisions of GATT. I 2 Third, most of the
GATT negotiations have not dealt with agricultural trade barriers.113
Only the last three rounds, the Dillon Round (1960-61), the Kennedy
Round (1963-67) and the Tokyo Round (1973-79), have included agri-
cultural trade barriers and these achieved only limited success in increas-
ing efficiency of international grain trade through reductions. 1 4 If the
GATT is to be more effective in the future, these policy problems must
be resolved in order to slow the trend toward protectionism and the con-
sequent inefficient use of resources.
In an effort to moderate the erratic effects of foreign grain produc-
tion and demand on domestic and world prices, the United States has
periodically entered into bilateral or long-term agreements (LTA) with
several countries, including Poland, Mexico, and most recently the Peo-
ple's Republic of China (PRC) and the USSR."'
The provisions of a bilateral agreement "specify the flow of one or
more commodities between two countries for a given time period.""' 6
An exporting country benefits from an LTA through expanded markets
and a stabilized demand for exports." 7 It was largely this feature that
made the recent U.S.-USSR and U.S.-PRC long-term agreements so at-
tractive. Both the USSR and PRC are large, unpredictable customers in
the world grain market; an LTA allows the United States to "stabilize to
some degree the quantities directly purchased" from the United States,
while at the same time providing the United States with valuable market
information disclosed through the agreement.18
Importing countries also benefit from bilateral agreements. To the
importer, a long-term agreement represents a guaranteed grain supply
for a specified time period. When world population is growing at a rate
faster than world agricultural production, an increasing number of coun-
tries want to lock in grain supplies through the provisions of an LTA."I9
The United States is not the only nation to utilize LTA's; other
countries that have negotiated bilateral agreements include China, Ar-
gentina and Canada. China has negotiated agreements with Argentina,
112 p. O'Brien, World Market Trends and Prospects: Implications for U.S. Agricultural Policy
23 (May 15, 1984).
113 U.S. FARM EXPORT STRATEGIES, supra note 83, at 148-49.
114 See A. WEBB, supra note 43, at 35.
115 Cramer & Heid, supra note 6, at 245-46.
116 A. Webb & E. Wilson, An Overview of Bilateral Trade Agreements for Agricultural Com-
modities in International Markets 2 (U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, ESS Staff Report No. AGES 810616,
June 1981).
117 Id. at 3.
118 R. BAIN, CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL GRAIN TRADE IN THE 1980's, at 14 (U.S.
Dep't of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Economic Report No. 167, July 1981).
119 Cramer & Heid, supra note 6, at 29.
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Australia, Canada, the EC and the United States. 120 Argentina has had
agreements with the Iraq, Mexico, Algeria, Cuba and the PRC.121 Can-
ada has had agreements with Brazil, China, Jamaica, Mexico, Poland,
and the USSR.'22 As the previous list indicates, long-term agreements
are very popular, largely because they "help stabilize trade flows between
two countries."
' 12 3
Regardless of their benefits, bilateral agreements have distinct disad-
vantages. The most obvious problem created by bilateral agreements is
the restriction of free market mechanics. 124 "As an increasing share of
global grain trade is brought under such agreements, one can expect
more severe adjustment burdens in countries that rely on relatively free
market conditions to balance changing supplies with demand." 125 The
decreasing available grain supply in turn increases price instability for
nonparticipating countries.1 26
Another problem that arises with LTA's is that bilateral agreements
are government-to-government, instead of private grain company trans-
actions. 127 Many importers prefer government agreements because
"agreements with private firms are easily negated by political and foreign
policy considerations."' 121 Understandably, private grain firms do not
share this attitude and look at bilateral agreements as government inter-
ference that negatively affects their business.' 29 In the long run, the in-
creased utilization of bilateral agreements will only be feasible if price
and supply compensation is provided for those parties who are unable to
participate in the agreements.
The regulations in the preceding examples have an influence on the
efficiency of grain marketing and indirectly on the cost and availability of
food in the United States and around the globe. Although a complete
review of regulations is not available, economic analyses of individual
policies or categories of regulations provide abundant examples of the
120 ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, CHINA: OUTLOOK AND
SITUATION REPORT 27 (June 1984).
121 CORN, supra note 45, at 17.
122 Cramer & Heid, supra note 6, at 311.
123 A. Webb & E. Wilson, supra note 116, at 5.
124 Nuttal & Sorenson, Bilateral Agreements as a Response to Emerging International Market
Conditions, in CONSORTIUM ON TRADE RESEARCH: AGRICULTURAL IMPORT DEMAND IN Low
INCOME, MIDDLE INCOME AND CENTRALLY PLANNED COUNTRIES 24 (U.S. Dep't of Agriculture,
Foreign Agricultural Economic Report No. 173, Aug. 1982).
125 THE WORLD FOOD INSTITUTE, VORLD FOOD TRADE AND U.S. AGRICULTURE, 1960-
1982, at 50 (Iowa State University, Aug. 1983).
126 Nuttal & Sorrenson, supra note 124, at 24.
127 A. Webb & E. Wilson, supra note 116, at 8.
128 Id at 10-11.
129 id at 10.
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economic consequences of government involvement in the operation of
international grain trade.
An incentive-response model provides an explanation of the connec-
tion between regulatory policies and economic efficiency as identified in
the preceding examples. The conceptual model is one in which informed
decision makers respond to economic incentives within the limits created
by the regulatory environment. Changes in these decisions and in opera-
tional efficiency can be induced by altering the incentives or the regula-
tory environment. The orderly, regulated system for marketing grain
and the availability of sophisticated pricing and marketing institutions
lowers the cost of marketing and accounts for much of the economic
progress in developed economies.1 30 The production of adequate food
supplies is also technically feasible in most developing economies,' 31 but
the distortion of incentives leads to inefficiencies in the marketing and
distribution system which in turn thwarts attempts to increase food sup-
plies. 132 Legislation and regulations, and the institutions which they fos-
ter, influence the cost of grain marketing and generate the incentives to
which farmers and marketing firms respond.1 33 The quantity and quality
of grain available to consumers are the result of responses to these incen-
tives and the regulations from which they emanate.
III. THE IMPACT OF REGULATORY POLICY ON EFFICIENCY
Three examples will be selected from the preceding list to illustrate
the role of regulatory policy on efficiency. The three examples are: (1)
state and federal warehouse laws and related legislation which protects
producers in case of elevator bankruptcy, (2) federal grades and stan-
dards for grain, and (3) marketing practices in international trade.
A. State and Federal Warehouse Laws
In the United States, state134 and federal 131 warehouse laws provide
legal protection for farmers storing grain in commercial facilities. Since
farmers often wish to retain ownership of grain in anticipation of price
rises after harvest, storage is a necessary function. The least cost pattern
of storage would allocate most of the grain marketed to commercial
130 Cramer & Heid, supra note 6, at 141, 239.
131 Islan, World Agricultural Growth-Short and Long-Term Aspects, Past and Future-An
Overview, in GROWTH AND EQUITY IN AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT 197 (Proceedings of the
18th Int'l Conference of Agricultural Economists, 1983).
132 Schultz, supra note 1, at 67.
133 CORN, supra note 45, at 31.
134 E.g., Public Grain Warehouse and Warehouse Receipts Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 114,
§ 214 (1983).
135 See, eg., United States Warehouse Act, 7 U.S.C. § 241 (1982).
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warehouses, because economies of scale136 favor large commercial bins
over small farm bins.' 3 7 Use of commercial warehouses by farmers is
encouraged by assurance that the quantity and quality of grain deposited
for storage will be maintained. This assurance is provided by federal and
state warehouse laws that regulate public grain warehousemen. Despite
these regulations and the accompanying inspection of facilities, farmers
have frequently suffered losses associated with financial failures of coun-
try elevators.138 During recent bankruptcy proceedings, farmers received
payment for less than seventy percent of the full value of grain warehouse
claims at elevators filing for bankruptcy.' 39 Additional changes in Illi-
nois law provide an insurance fund"4 for protection against losses, espe-
cially where illegal actions by a manager might leave insufficient grain in
the warehouse to cover the amount represented by outstanding ware-
house receipts.
Early warehouse laws required the warehouseman to maintain the
integrity of each lot of grain absent the consent of the owner.14 ' Since
grain identified by federal grades is, in general, a homogeneous, inter-
changeable commodity, the need for segregating each lot unnecessarily
increased the cost of storing grain. This increased cost of storage was in
turn passed on to the farmer and inefficiencies resulted.
These inefficiencies have been largely eliminated. Changes advo-
cated by the grain industry and later by state regulatory agencies' 42 have
been adopted and warehouse laws now commonly permit the practice of
comingling grain of the same kind and grade.' 43 In fact, Illinois law al-
lows a warehouseman to refuse to accept grain when the identity of the
lot is to be preserved."
Under current warehouse laws, each farmer-seller receives a ware-
house receipt for the quantity and quality of grain delivered. 145 The ele-
136 C. CHASE & D. HELGESON, COST ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL NORTH DAKOTA SUB-
TERMINAL SYSTEMs 3 (Dep't of Agricultural Economics, N. Dakota State University, Agricultural
Economics Report No. 156, Feb. 1983).
137 Hill and Blokland, Grain Marketing, in ADvANcES IN CEREAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOL-
OGY 21 (Y. Pomerantz, American Association of Cereal Chemists, Inc. ed. 1976).
138 R. CASEY, D. CONLEY & J. AHLEN, GRAIN ELEVATOR INSOLVENCIES AND BANKRUPT-
CIES IN EIGHT NORTH CENTRAL STATES, 1974-1982, at 9 (Ill. Legislative Council, Mem. File 9-
391, Mar. 1984).
139 REPORT OF THE AD Hoc SUBCOMMITrEE ON GRAIN ELEVATOR BANKRUPTCY TO THE
HOUSE COMM. ON AGRICULTURE, 98TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 37 (Comm. Print 1983).
140 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 114, § 3701 (1983).
141 See, eg., LLL. CONST. OF 1870 art. XIII, § 2.
142 See Review of Grain Elevator Bankruptcies: Hearings Before the Ad Hoc Subcomm on
Grain Elevator Bankruptcy of the House Comm on Agriculture, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. (1983).
143 See, eg., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 114, § 214-(1983).
144 Id. §§ 214, 214.11.
145 See, eg., 7 U.S.C. §§ 214, 259 (1982); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 114, §§ 214, 214.17, 214.21
(1983).
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vator manager is held responsible for maintaining on the premises the
quantity and quality represented by the sum of all the individual ware-
house receipts,146 but need not maintain the identity of each individual
lot. Thus, costs of storage are reduced and the increased efficiency is
reflected in lower storage charges to the producer.
These lower charges are an incentive to farmers to store in commer-
cial facilities rather than to build storage bins on the farm. 47 Thus, the
changes just described in warehouse laws altered the balance between on-
farm and off-farm storage capacity, reduced investment in farm storage
bins, increased the value of stored grain warehouse receipts and im-
proved the profitability of storing grain in commercial facilities.
The warehouse laws become especially important when elevators en-
counter financial problems and are unable to pay producers and other
creditors. Although state warehouse receipts were intended to protect
farmers with grain stored for them by commercial grain warehousemen,
several bankruptcy cases in Illinois and other states left insufficient funds
to repay holders of warehouse receipts as well as unsecured creditors. 4 '
From January 1974 through May 1982 Illinois farmers lost $1.5 million
through elevator insolvencies and bankruptcy proceedings.149 Neither
bankruptcy regulations or warehouse receipts were sufficient protection
for farmers. Changes in the Illinois Public Grain Warehouse Act 150 and
the Grain Dealers Act"'1 provided increased protection for producers.
The Illinois warehouse law as amended gave the Department of Agricul-
ture authority to raise bonding requirements for dealers of questionable
financial position 5 2 to restrict speculation, 53 and to require annual fi-
nancial statements prepared according to generally accepted accounting
principles. 1 These requirements increased costs to elevator managers
but reduced the risk of financial loss to farmers storing grain in commer-
cial warehouses. This increased protection was still considered inade-
quate by many and on August 16, 1983, Illinois passed the Grain
Insurance Act.155 Collection of mandatory premiums from grain ware-
housemen created an insurance fund that has provided more complete
146 See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 114, §§ 214, 214.9 (1983).
147 J. Scor, THE ECONOMICS OF CORN CONDMONING AND STORAGE ALTERNATIVES FOR
FARMERS 13 (Dep't of Agricultural Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, No.
AERR-98, Jan. 1969).
148 R. CASEY, D. CONLEY & J. AHLEN, supra note 138, at 11.
149 Id.
150 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 114, § 214 (1983).
151 Id. ch. 111, § 301.
152 Id. ch. 114, §§ 214, 214.8.
153 Letter from Ill. Dep't of Agriculture to all Illinois Grain Dealers (June 24, 1980) (discuss-
ing policy).
154 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 114, §§ 214, 214.3 (1983).
155 Id. § 701.
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protection. According to statements by Illinois Department of Agricul-
ture officials, "every claim by farmers that has been adjudicated valid has
been paid in full, either by elevator assets or from the insurance fund,"
since the implementation of the Act.
1 5 6
Most other grain exporting nations also have warehouse laws to pro-
tect storers of grain. For example, Argentina has separate warehouse
regulations for grain for internal consumption1 5 7 and for export.1 58
Warehouse receipts are registered by the Junta Nacional de Granos and
delivery is guaranteed to purchasers in case of loss of grain, theft or fail-
ure to comply with warehouse regulations. The strength of the ware-
house law protects farmers with grain in commercial storage, but other
losses are handled under general bankruptcy regulations. 15 9
B. Grain Grades and Standards
Perhaps the best illustration of the role of regulation in creating in-
centives can be found in the application of grading standards to domestic
and international grain trade.
Grading standards for any product have the objective of enabling
buyers to specify a numerical grade and know the quality they will re-
ceive without personally inspecting and analyzing every lot sold. 6° Stan-
dards also eliminate the necessity of exchanging samples in widely
separated geographical markets.161 U.S. grain grading standards affect
the international as well as the domestic markets; first, because the U.S.
supplies a major share of world trade in coarse grains 62 (sixty percent in
fiscal 1983)163 and, second, because many grain producing nations have
patterned their standards after those of the United States. 64 The U.S.
grain standards developed out of a need for increased marketing effi-
156 Interview with Tom Jennings, Division of Agricultural Industry Regulation, Illinois De-
partment of Agriculture, in Springfield (Jan. 4, 1984).
157 Telephone conversation with Eduardo Regunaga, Junta Nacional de Granos, Buenos Aires
(discussing Argentina Resolution 37).
158 Id. (discussing Argentina Resolution 1825).
159 Law No. 19.550 (Argentina).
160 Cramer & Heid, supra note 6, at 120.
161 Id.
162 Coarse grains include feed grains (corn, barley, oats, grain sorghum) and rye, plus millet in
some foreign countries.
163 ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE AND FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF
AGRICULTURE, OUTLOOK FOR U.S. AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS 10 (May 17, 1984).
164 South Africa, Brazil, Canada, and Argentina have grain grades similar to those of the
United States-numerical grades with factor limits. See Regulations for Regulating the Require-
ments in Connection with the Export of Maize from the Republic of South Africa, No. R 1070 (June
17, 1977); CANADIAN GRAIN COMMISSION, GRAIN GRADING HANDBOOK FOR EASTERN CANADA
(Aug. 1980).
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ciency over a period of several centuries 165 and a description of the issues
and their resolution demonstrate the effect of regulations on incentives
and efficiency.
1. History of Grain Grading
Grain grading and quality standardization dates back at least to
thirteenth century London when town ordinances prohibited the mixing
of moldy corn with good corn. 166 Ordinances from thirteenth-century
records also specified that the quality of corn was to be regulated in cities
of medieval France. 167 With the development of more formal marketing
systems, additional regulations were needed to facilitate handling an in-
creasingly large volume of grain traded over an ever larger geographical
area. 168 To satisfy their trading needs, dealers prepared samples of the
grain to be sold and exhibited or exchanged them in establishing price.169
As trade volume continued to grow, they began issuing statements to
describe the general quality or character of the grain. The terms "sweet,
dry, and merchantable" trace to a proclamation issued by the Lord
Mayor of London in 1511.170 The use of descriptive terms became
widely adopted and by the eighteenth century were common throughout
the grain trade. In 1846, the Buffalo market reported the sale of "forty-
nine hundred bushels, Massillion wheat, a beautiful sample, the berry
being plump and of a bright yellow hue." '171
As production in the United States increased in the beginning of the
nineteenth century and grain exports became an important source of for-
eign exchange, the various exporting agencies, port authorities and
boards of trade began to establish more formal quality standards in each
market. 172 In 1856, the Chicago Board of Trade (CBT), a volunteer or-
ganization of businessmen organized in 1848, formally adopted a system
of grain grading using descriptive terminology. 73 In the following year,
inspectors were appointed to grade grain received in Chicago using those
standards.174 International trade was an important influence in this de-
165 U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, Misc. PUB. No. 328, THE SERVICE OF FEDERAL GRAIN
STANDARDS 1-5 (Dec. 1938) [hereinafter cited as U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE PUB. No. 328].
166 N. GRAS, THE EVOLUTION OF THE ENGLISH CORN MARKET FROM THE TWELFTH TO
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 69-72 (1915).
167 Id. at 71 n.4.
168 U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE PUB. No. 328, supra note 165, at 1-2.
169 Id. at 2.
170 N. GRAS, supra note 166, at 78 n.1.
171 Milwaukee Daily Sentinel and Gazette. Sept. 25, 1846, at 2, col. 2.
172 C. PHILLIPS, HISTORY OF GRAIN INSPECTION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1838-1936, at 51-
54 (U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Grain Division, 1936).
173 HISTORY OF THE BOARD OF TRADE OF THE CrrY OF CHICAGO 220-21 (C. Taylor ed. 1917)
[hereinafter cited as Taylor].
174 Id. at 227-28.
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velopment of grading by descriptive term.'7 5 Chicago tradesmen started
shipping grain directly from Chicago to Liverpool'76 and by 1856 the
United States exported nearly 500,000 tons of corn and wheat into the
United Kingdom.'7 7 This export trade required descriptive terms on offi-
cial documents and the CBT grading standards provided the early lan-
guage. The standards were refined in subsequent years and by 1860 they
were being applied to all grain received into Chicago warehouses. 78 One
of the earliest attempts to specify numerical grades was introduced by the
Chicago Board of Trade in 1857; spring wheat was classified into "club
spring," "No.1 spring," and "No. 2 spring."'
179
Other commercial organizations, including the Boards of Trade at
Milwaukee, Detroit, Toledo, Cleveland and St. Louis, followed the lead
of the Chicago Board of Trade in establishing grades and inspection pro-
cedures, but each agency selected its own set of standards and terminol-
ogy. 8 The diversity of descriptive terminology and grading practices
soon created inefficiencies and disputes within the grain markets.18 ' The
standards adopted often represented the regional practices in a fairly lo-
cal market.'8 2 Moreover, inspection equipment was crude and inspection
procedures varied from inspector to inspector as well as between mar-
kets. i8 3 The grades themselves made objective and uniform interpreta-
tion and application difficult. Most had no quantifiable factors attached
to them and descriptive terms were subject to the interpretation of each
inspector. 8
4
When the trade changed from the use of submitted samples to the
use of numerical grades in domestic trade, European grain buyers had to
rely upon the certificate of inspection rather than on visual inspection of
a sample. 185 Variations in grading and the quality of grain received gen-
175 J. SHANAHAN, C. LEIGHTY & E. BOERNER, AMERICAN EXPORT CORN (MAIZE) IN Eu-
ROPE 1-5 (U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Bureau of Plant Industry Circular No. 55, Mar. 26, 1910).
176 1 A. ANDREAS, HISTORY OF CHICAGO FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE PRESENT
TIME 243 (1884).
177 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF MANAGERS OF THE NEW YORK PRODUCE Ex-
CHANGE 415, 417 (1873).
178 CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE, THIRD ANNUAL STATEMENT OF THE TRADE AND COM-
MERCE OF CHICAGO, FOR THE YEAR ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1860, at 13 (1861).
179 Taylor, supra note 173, at 227.
180 C. PHILLIPS, supra note 172, at 26.
181 Uniform Rules for Grading Grain, Grain Dealers J., Oct. 25, 1908, at 549, 549-50 [hereinaf-
ter cited as Uniform Rules].
182 Id.
183 Phillips, Supervision of Grain Inspection, Grain Dealers J., Apr. 25, 1918, at 654.
184 Uniform Rules, supra note 181, at 549.
185 GRAIN GRADING AND INSPECTION AND INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE IN
GRAINS, S. Doc. No. 116, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1907) [hereinafter cited as GRAIN GRADING].
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erated dissatisfaction on the part of the European buyer.186 In 1906,
USDA investigations of grain shipments in U.S. and European ports
demonstrated that the quality upon arrival in Europe was sometimes far
below that shown on the certificate issued at origin ports.187 On January
1, 1899, the incoming President of the Chicago Board of Trade reported
that English merchants found the method of certification unreliable, and
the CBT had received bitter complaints from individual exporters. 8
Importers from Marseille, France, sent a cable to CBT stating that be-
cause of the low quality received they would handle no more U.S. wheat
except by sample.1 89 Inequities and inefficiency resulting from the grad-
ing of grain, both at home and abroad, prompted members of the trade to
search for more uniform and consistent methods for grading.1 90
Some members of the industry turned to state government for solu-
tions to these problems. The Illinois Constitution of 1870 gave the Gen-
eral Assembly power to pass laws governing the inspection of grain 91
and in 1871 a warehouse act took inspection out of the control of the
private inspectors and placed it in the hands of the State Railroad and
Warehouse Commission. 192  Other states adopted state wide stan-
dards, 193 but state control did not solve the problems of subjectivity and
the variation among grading standards and procedures from market to
market and state to state. 194
Industry and government spokesmen and trade associations work-
ing for voluntary uniform national standards were unable to obtain ac-
ceptance by the industry.1 95  Even standards that were tentatively
accepted by the various inspection agencies could not be enforced.1 96
Although the Grain Dealers National Association (GDNA) made major
strides towards reconciling differences within the industry and developed
a set of grades based on a more scientific approach and more objective
186 42 CONG. REc. 4074 (1908) (letter to the President of the United States from Robert Pat-
terson, Chin. of the European Int'l Comm. on American Grain Certificates).
187 42 CONG. REc. 4074-50 (1908).
188 C. PHILLIPS, supra note 172, at 42.
189 Id.
190 See GRAIN GRADING, supra note 185, at 1, 4.
191 ILL. CONST. art. XIII, § 7.
192 1871 Il. Laws 762.
193 W. Combs, How the U.S. Grain Standards Originated and How They Facilitate the Mar-
keting of Grain at Country Points 5 (February 21, 1945) (U.S. Dep't of Agriculture paper delivered
at Oklahoma City).
194 See Address by J.Shanahan, supra note 20.
195 Duvel, Grain Standardization, 6 CANADIAN MILLER AND CEREALIST 139-41 (1914).
196 Oppose M'Cumber Bill and National Ass'n Grades, Grain Dealers J., Feb. 25, 1909, at 258;
Annual Meeting Indiana Grain Dealers' Association, Grain Dealers J., Jan. 25, 1909, at 108; 13th
Annual Meeting Grain Dealers National Association, Grain Dealers J., Oct. 10, 1909, at 456-57;
Grain Dealers J., June, 10, 1909, at 729.
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factors, 197 it failed to obtain voluntary nationwide adoption of the stan-
dards. An alternative approach of federal control was suggested in Con-
gress as early as 1890,198 but these early efforts conflicted with the
GDNA's efforts to generate voluntary standards and without industry
support the bills made little progress. When the GDNA admitted failure
in their attempt to obtain voluntary cooperation, they shifted their sup-
port to federal legislation.199 The GDNA assisted in writing the U.S.
Grain Standards Act of 1916,200 and their support was essential to its
passage. 20
1
The legislation that finally passed was a compromise between those
groups demanding complete federal control over all aspects of grading
and inspection of grain and those preferring federal grades of a voluntary
nature. 20 2 The Grain Standards Act of 1916203 gave the Secretary of Ag-
riculture authority to establish a single set of standards and to enforce
exclusive use of standards for grading all grain moving in interstate and
foreign commerce.20 4 Inspectors were to be licensed by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture but were not to be employees of the federal govern-
ment.205 A system of appeals was established whereby dissatisfaction or
disputes could be resolved by federal employees using the standards and
procedures established. 0 6 In 1916, under the authority of the Grade
Standards Act, the USDA adopted the 1914 preliminary grades for corn
that the industry had been using on a trial basis for two years. 2 7 Stan-
dards for other grains were developed as market volumes increased.208
Establishing federal standards, however, did not resolve the conflicts
197 New Inspection Rules Adopted, Grain Dealers J., Oct. 25, 1908, at 558-60.
198 In 1890 Senator Algernon S. Paddock of Beatrice, Nebraska, introduced S4027, a bill to
provide for both federal grading and inspection of grain. S4027, 51st Cong., 1st Sess., 21 CONG.
REc. 5674-75 (1890).
199 Grain Dealers J., Mar. 10, 1909, at 311; The Federal Inspection Agitation, Grain Dealers J.,
Apr. 10, 1909, at 441; Law Needed to Require Uniform Rules, Grain Dealers J., Mar. 25, 1909, at
373.
200 Grain Standards Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-190, 39 Stat. 482 (1917).
201 53 CONG. REc. 7044 (1916).
202 Id at 7043.
203 Grain Standards Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-190, 39 Stat. 482 (1917).
204 Id §§ 2,4.
205 Id § 7.
206 Id. § 6.
207 OFFICE OF MARKETS AND RURAL ORGANIZATION, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, SER-
VICE AND REGULATORY ANNOUNCEMENTS No. 11, OFFICIAL GRAIN STANDARDS OF THE UNITED
STATES FOR SHELLED CORN (1916).
208 The USDA prepared and promulgated grades for winter wheat in July, 1917 and for other
wheat in August, 1917. These were followed by standards for feed oats in June, 1919, grain sorghum
in December, 1924, barley in August, 1926, and flaxseed in August, 1934. Grades for soybeans were
promulgated in November, 1940 after an amendment to the Grain Standards Act assured its applica-
bility to soybeans. FEDERAL GRAIN INSPECTION SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, HISTOR-
ICAL REVIEW OF CHANGES IN THE GRAIN STANDARDS OF THE UNITED STATES (May 1980).
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between the various buyers and sellers who sought the maximum com-
petitive advantage or attempted to determine those rules that would pro-
vide increased efficiency or profits. The debates and disputes prevalent in
the 1800's resurfaced many times over the next century despite numerous
regulatory changes in the standards and seven legislative changes in the
Grain Standards Act.20 9 The recurrence of these issues reflect concern
over the incentives created by the regulations and their effect on grading,
pricing and operational efficiency in the industry.
Many of these issues are unresolved, in part because of lack of agree-
ment among the parties on the purposes of grading standards. While the
USDA accepts the principle that the purpose of grading standards is to
provide information from which buyers and sellers can determine
value,210 grain merchandisers are more concerned with obtaining uni-
form, interchangeable quantities to facilitate transactions with a mini-
mum of description. It has been argued that grading standards are in
principle neutral and that market forces establish value and discounts.211
However, in practice the neutrality principle is subject to question. For
example, the market places price differentials only on those grade fac-
tors212 included in the standards even though other factors are economi-
cally important.213 Conversely, price differentials are generally put on all
factors in the standards even though some of these factors have little
relevance to value in feeding or processing.21 4
The role of standards in generating incentives can be illustrated
through a comparison of grading standards in the U.S. and Argentina.
Blending of high and low moisture corn in the U.S. has been blamed for
some of the moisture problems in the export market.21 5 In U.S. stan-
dards and marketing practices, 15.5 percent moisture is used as the basis
for price. Much of the corn is stored at lower moisture levels and the
standard of 15.5 percent is attained in the market by blending high and
209 See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 750, 54 Stat. 765 (1940); Pub. L. No. 861, 70 Stat. 780 (1956); Pub. L.
No. 85-509, 72 Stat. 352 (1958); Pub. L. No. 90-487, 82 Stat. 761 (1968); Pub. L. No. 94-582, 90
Stat. 2867 (1976); Pub. L. No. 96-437, 94 Stat. 1870 (1980).
210 FEDERAL GRAIN INSPECTION SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, REPORT ON THE
ADEQUACY OF EXISTING OFFICIAL U.S. STANDARDS FOR GRAIN (Nov. 1978).
211 S. BERMINGHAM & L. HILL, A FAIR AVERAGE QUALITY FOR GRAIN EXPORTS 6 (Dep't
of Agricultural Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, July 1978).
212 Numerical grades are determined by comparing test results with minimum or maximum
values on each of several quality factors specified in the grading standards. E.g. No. 1 soybeans must
contain not more than 13.0 percent moisture, 10.0 percent split beans, 2.0 percent total damage, etc.
213 Hill, Improving Grades and Standards for Soybeans, in WORLD SOYBEAN RESEARCH CON-
FERENCE II: PROCEEDINGS 825-26 (1980).
214 Hill & Jensen, The Role of Grades and Standards in Identifying Nutritive Value of Grain, in
FEED COMPOSITION, ANNUAL NUTRIENT REQUIREMENTS AND COMPUTERIZATION OF DmIS
258-63 (Utah State University, 1977).
215 Letter from Japan Feed Trade Association to Foreign Agricultural Service, U.S. Dep't of
Agriculture (Feb. 28, 1983).
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low moisture corn. Argentina, however, experiences few problems with
moisture. First, because base moisture is set at 14.5 instead of 15.5 per-
cent,216 corn can be safely stored and shipped at the base moisture con-
tent. Second, because moisture is not a grade determining factor, there is
no incentive for blending wet corn with dry corn. Regulations related to
grades thus influence the cost of marketing and the value of the product
delivered to the buyer.
U.S. corn standards combine broken corn and foreign material into
a single factor, with maximum limits for each numerical grade.2" 7 Ar-
gentine corn standards classify broken corn and foreign material as sepa-
rate factors.218 This distinction reduces the amount of dirt or weed seeds
that can be included in any grade. U.S. corn219 and soybean 220 standards
also include test weight as a grade factor despite the lack of scientific
evidence relating test weight to economic value. The standards for corn
and soybeans in Brazil and Argentina, and for corn in South Africa and
USSR, do not include test weight. Test weight in U.S. standards has
generated an incentive for farmers to select high test weight varieties in
order to avoid price discounts for low test weight.
The factors included and excluded from grading standards, as well
as the limits placed on each factor to determine numerical grade, create
incentives which are viewed as beneficial to one group or another. The
search for rule changes in grading standards that will alter the economic
opportunities and distribution of profits has generated a debate over
grading that has continued for over one hundred years.
2. The Issue of Moisture in the Grading Standards
One of the issues that has surfaced many times and in many forms
throughout the history of grain grading is the question of moisture.
Clearly, grain with different moisture levels must also have different in-
trinsic value221 since soybean meal or pounds of beef cannot be produced
from water.
Overall marketing efficiency is decreased if grading and pricing
practices motivate farmers and elevators to incur costs that generate in-
come but do not increase the intrinsic value of the grain. For example, if
water can be added to grain without reducing its price per weighed quan-
216 Resolucion No. 20.275, supra note 51.
217 FOREIGN GRAIN INSPECTION SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, OFFICIAL UNITED
STATES STANDARDS FOR GRAIN 2.3 (Jan. 1984) [hereinafter cited as OFFICIAL U.S. STANDARDS
FOR GRAIN].
218 See Resolucion No. 20.275, supra note 51.
219 OFFICIAL U.S. STANDARDS FOR GRAIN, supra note 217, at 2.3.
220 Id. at 8.4.
221 Intrinsic value of grain is the value of the grain after it has been converted to products
through feeding or processing.
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tity then, while income to the seller is increased, no additional value is
obtained since it is only the dry matter in the grain that generates the
final product. The standards established in 1916 require moisture to be
less than 15.5 percent for No. 2 corn. 22 Over time, the market estab-
lished No. 2 corn as the basis for price bids and any corn with moisture
above 15.5 percent receives less than full price.223 Corn with moisture
below 15.5 percent receives an implicit discount because of a loss of
weight not compensated by increased price.22 4 Thus, the regulation es-
tablishing standards has determined that 15.5 percent moisture corn pro-
vides the seller the maximum returns. However, 15.5 percent moisture
corn cannot be safely stored during warm weather 2 5 and cannot be
safely shipped in closed ocean vessels.22 6 Moreover, it is not the opti-
mum moisture content for processing. 27 In short, almost no one in the
grain industry prefers corn at 15.5 percent except for purposes of meeting
an arbitrary moisture standard established for No. 2 corn.
Although the yield of dry corn per acre is fixed at the time of har-
vest, the weight delivered to the elevator varies with moisture content.
Excess water in the corn (above the 15.5 percent price base) receives a
price discount because there is less dry matter per ton or per bushel.
However, the market does not pay a premium for corn below 15.5 per-
cent even though drier corn contains more dry matter per ton or per
bushel. When corn is dried to safe storage moisture, the farmer will de-
liver less total weight to the elevator and be paid the 15.5 percent mois-
ture price, thus reducing the farmer's income.
A similar situation exists for soybeans, although moisture levels be-
low the base of thirteen percent often occur in the field before harvest is
completed. Soybean processors prefer soybeans at ten percent moisture.
Again, however, farmers who deliver at this moisture level receive an
implicit discount through less total weight. With no price or quantity
adjustment for moisture level below the base, farmers who deliver grain
222 OFFICIAL U.S. STANDARDS FOR GRAIN, supra note 217, at 2.3. Number 2 is a numerical
grade in the standards for corn. To be graded No. 2 the sample of corn tested must contain not more
than 15.5 percent moisture, 3.0 percent broken corn and foreign material, 5.0 percent total damaged
kernels, and .2 percent heat-damaged kernels and test weight must be 54 lb/bu. or greater.
223 Cramer & Heid, supra note 6, at 126-36.
224 P. Bloome, Management Implications of the Market Value of Moisture in Grain (paper
prepared for 1983 Winter Meeting of Am. Soc. of Agricultural Engineers, Dec. 1983).
225 Shove, Wet Grain Aeration for Holding and Drying Shelled Corn, in ALTERNATIVES FOR
CONDITIONING AND STORING CORN AT FARM AND ELEVATOR 7 (Proceedings of a Regional Con-
ference, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Feb. 1970).
226 G. AYERST & H. LENIGER, REPORT ON HEAT DAMAGE TO ARGENTINE MAIZE DURING
SHIPMENT TO EUROPE 46 (Dec. 1967).
227 J. Freeman, Quality Factors Affecting Value of Corn for Wet Milling 8 (paper prepared for
1971 Winter Meeting of Am. Soc. of Agricultural Engineers, Dec. 1971).
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at optimum moisture levels are penalized.228
For any grain below the base moisture, the standards and pricing
methods create an incentive to increase the moisture content in order to
avoid implicit discounts. Many farmers and elevator managers have dis-
covered several methods to increase the moisture content of soybeans
and corn which is below the base moisture level.229 One method is to
blend high moisture grain with low moisture grain, permitting moisture
to move from wet kernels to dry kernels until they reach an equilibrium.
Another alternative is the use of aeration fans to force high moisture air
into stored grain. Moisture from the air is absorbed by the kernels and
moisture content increased. Water may also be added directly to the
grain. All three methods achieve the same end result. When research
describing techniques for adding water directly to corn, soybeans or
wheat was published in 1980,230 the United States Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA) offered the opinion that any method of adding water
to grain constitutes adulteration of food as defined under section
402(b)(4) of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.231
The regulations in the grade standards that establish moisture levels
for each grade in each grain are translated into incentives through the
pricing practices of an industry that has accepted these moisture levels as
a basis for price discounts. Sellers who respond to these incentives by
rewetting grain to the moisture levels the market has established, how-
ever, are in violation of the FDA regulations. Thus, while moisture may
be removed to reach base moisture levels in grain, the same moisture may
not be returned without violating federal regulations. The grain quality,
however, is the same whether grain is dried to the base moisture or
rewetted to the base moisture.
These conflicting incentives result in inefficiences. First, market in-
centives encourage storing grain at moisture levels above those recom-
mended for safe storage. Losses from spoilage are frequent. Second,
market incentives encourage the addition of moisture to meet grade stan-
dards. Rewetting and blending in response to the arbitrary moisture
levels dictated by the standards involve an additional cost without any
real increase in value. The inefficiency is one of creating economic incen-
tives for uneconomic actions.
Removal of moisture as a grading factor is one step toward rational-
izing these inconsistencies. In the United States, on September 12, 1984,
regulatory action by the USDA removed moisture as a grade determin-
228 P. Bloome, supra note 224, at 1-2.
229 Hill & Shove, What are Farmer's Alternatives Concerning Moisture Content of Grain Going
to Elevator?, 10 SoUTHWEsT FARM PRESS 14, 14-15 (Jan. 13, 1983).
230 Boome, Moisture Shrink in Stored Wheat May Be Biggest Loss Factor, 7 SouTHWEST
FARM PRESS (May 15, 1980).
231 Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 717, 52 Stat. 1046 (1938).
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ing factor for corn, soybeans and grain sorghum, to become effective Sep-
tember 9, 1985.232 However, an additional step is required before the
market will make the necessary adjustment. The quantity of grain
should be defined in terms of the dry matter it contains rather than the
present "legal bushel' 233 definition based on weight of water and grain
combined. As early as 1916, the USDA published recommendations that
grain be priced on the basis of the dry matter it contained, not on its wet
weight.2 34 Redefining the legal bushel would remove the incentive for
altering moisture content except to obtain the optimum storage and han-
dling moisture levels. The quantity of grain would be determined by its
weight, adjusted for differences in moisture. The weight of grain at vari-
ous moisture contents would be adjusted to the equivalent weight of
grain at the base moisture content.235 This change in the rules and regu-
lations would resolve several problems. It would: (1) remove incentives
for rewetting; (2) eliminate the conflict between the FDA and general
practices in the trade; (3) eliminate the need for and the cost involved in
blending diverse moisture contents solely for the purpose of meeting the
USDA standard; and (4) pay sellers on the basis of the quantity of dry
matter delivered regardless of the moisture level.236
However, managers in the grain industry object to this proposal on
the grounds that: (1) the equivalent bushel concept would eliminate the
income elevators now receive from blending wet and dry grain; (2) mois-
ture meters are not accurate enough to use as a basis for determining
equivalent bushels; (3) measuring moisture on all grain purchased would
require additional expense; and (4) separate bins would be needed for
each moisture level.237
There is a response to each of these concerns. First, elevator income
is determined by competitive forces setting prices for services performed.
Elimination of elevator profit opportunities from blending may require
higher charges for other services, but the total income from all sources
232 Rules and Regulations, 49 Fed. Reg. 35,743 (Sept. 12, 1984).
233 Quantities and prices for grain in the U.S. are generally quoted in terms of bushels. How-
ever, the bushel is determined by weight without regard to volume. The weight per bushel specified
for each grain is called the "legal weight per bushel" and was established for purposes of estimating
duties by the 39th Congress. In subsequent years individual states moved toward uniformity in
setting legal weights for each grain based on a Winchester bushel of 2150.42 cubic inches in capacity.
234 E. BOERNER, THE INTRINSIC VALUES OF GRAIN, COTTONSEED, FLOUR AND SIMILAR
PRODUCTS, BASED ON THE DRY-MATTER CONTENT (U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Bull. No. 374, Oct.
17, 1916).
235 Hill, The Standardized Bushel-Solution to the Grain Moisture Debate, in EVALUATION OF
THE ISSUES IN GRAIN GRADES AND OPTIMUM MOISTURES 25, 25-29 (Dep't of Agricultural Eco-
nomics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, No. AE-4548, Dec. 1982).
236 Id. at 27.
237 Irmen, Grain Moisture and Dry Weight Matter Marketing, National Grain and Feed Asso-
ciation Newsletter, Aug. 25, 1983.
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will be limited only by competing elevators. Second, commercial meters
have been sufficiently accurate for measuring moisture above the base
and have been used to determine discounts.238 It seems illogical that the
industry accepts the current degree of meter accuracy for discounting
farmers but not for establishing premiums. Third, the only time mois-
ture is not measured on farm-delivered corn is when the manager knows
the moisture will be below the base and he will receive a bonus of extra
bushels. Again, the expense is readily justified when farmers are being
discounted, but the argument asserts that the same procedure is too ex-
pensive to measure moisture when farmers may receive extra value.
Fourth, grain is already segregated according to moisture. The
equivalent bushel approach would eliminate the need to separate mois-
ture for purposes of standards and permit blending and segregation ac-
cording to good storage practices. The number of separate bins required
might even be reduced because all moisture levels would be priced on the
basis of dry matter and, whether separated or blended, their price and
quantity would remain unchanged.
Resolution of this debate between buyers and sellers of grain is only
possible if the justification for changing regulations is shifted to efficiency
rather than a redistribution of total value between buyers and sellers. If
rewetting grain is illegal and inefficient, but current marketing institu-
tions provide economic incentives to add water, then a change of incen-
tives through changes in policy is a more viable solution than policing
farmers and elevators to prohibit blending, rewetting and aeration.
Changing the "rules of the game" (i.e. regulations) can alter the distribu-
tion of income among the players, but it may also increase the total in-
come available for distribution.
C. Marketing Practices in International Trade
Quality loss and the condition of grain at foreign destinations has
been a constant concern throughout the history of grain exporting.
239
The chief complaints from foreign buyers are:
1. A high percent of broken kernels and foreign material at
destination.240
2. Excessive moisture at the time of unloading. 241
238 L. HILL & M. PAULSEN, SHRINK FACTORS FOR CORN USING RECALIBRATED MOISTURE
METERS 4 (Dep't of Agricultural Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, No. AE-
4542, Sept. 1982).
239 J. SHANAHAN, C. LEIGHTY & E. BOERNER, supra note 175, at 3-4.
240 L. HILL, M. PAULSEN & M. EARLY, CORN QUALITY: CHANGES DURING ExPORT 26
(College of Agriculture, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Spec. Pub. No. 58, Sept. 1979).
241 J. SHANAHAN, C. LEIGHTY & E. BOERNER, supra note 175, at 21.
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3. Low yields of final processed products from U.S. origin grain.2 42
These complaints often take the form of recommendations for pro-
ducers to grow better varieties, for grain exporters to load better quality,
for grain marketing firms to avoid blending and for export elevators to
clean grain just before loading.243 But these complaints generate little
action on the part of producers or grain marketing firms because they are
not accompanied by any economic incentives. When foreign buyers
specify No. 3 yellow corn in their contract, they are permitting a maxi-
mum of seven percent moldy kernels and four percent broken corn and
foreign material. 2" The economic incentives are very strong for the ex-
porter to load as close to that quality as his equipment and technology
will permit. Most corn received by the export elevator contains less than
seven percent moldy kernels, thus providing an opportunity for the eleva-
tor to purchase badly damaged corn at a discount, blend it into the corn
as it is being loaded at a rate to achieve seven percent and receive full
price for the moldy kernels. This obviously decreases the total "value" of
the corn for most uses, but it does not affect "price." Therefore, it en-
hances the income of the exporter and reduces value to the foreign buyer.
Maximum limits on foreign material generate incentives for the same
type of blending practices.
Breakage could be reduced at foreign destinations if producers
would select varieties and drying practices that would generate corn able
to stand up better under export handling.245 However, no economic in-
centives exist for producing this corn. If farmers incur a yield loss or
additional cost in producing the better quality, the lack of premium
would have the effect of penalizing farmers for producing good quality
corn for the foreign market.
Uniform grades, terminology and measurement devices contribute
to efficiency in international grain markets. Despite the progress over
several centuries of grain trading, uniformity has still not been achieved
in some areas. For example, the United States is one of the few nations
not using the metric system for measuring grain quantity and quality.
Moreover, moisture is one of the more objective factors in the standards
and its accurate determination is essential to establishing value. Yet, no
uniform measurement method has been accepted by all countries in-
242 Address by William Rankin, U.S. Feed Grains Council Seminar (Oct. 27, 1980) (quality of
U.S. grain for scotch grain whiskey).
243 Wichita Eagle Beacon, Oct. 7, 1984, at 9C.
244 FEDERAL GRAIN INSPECTION SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, THE OFFICIAL
UNITED STATES STANDARDS FOR GRAIN 2.1-2.5 (Jan. 1978).
245 See Paulsen, Hill, White & Sprague, Breakage Susceptibility of Common Corn-Belt Ge-
notypes, 26 TRANSACTIONS OF THE AM. Soc. AGRIC. ENGINEERS 1830 (1983).
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volved in international trade,24 6 basic reference methods differ among
countries24 7 and calibration validation in the United States is left to indi-
vidual state agencies, often with the result that moisture meters in differ-
ent states do not give comparable readings.248 The lack of uniformity
and the confusion created by inconsistent moisture readings among
points in the market channel generate inefficiencies in marketing. In gen-
eral, it will require changes in international institutions in order to re-
duce these inefficiencies.
Perhaps the most dramatic quality problem in the international
markets is that many quality factors important to the foreign buyer are
not included in the U.S. standards.24 9 Consequently, there are no incen-
tives at any point in the market channel for improving quality on those
characteristics. Thus, farmers are not encouraged to choose varieties or
technology that would increase the yield of starch or flaking grits250 or
even nutritional value because current grading standards include very
few factors that relate to value for processing or feeding. Farmers pro-
ducing soybeans with higher protein or oil content do not receive higher
prices. Improvement in grading standards requires adequate incentives
at each point in the market channel. Since the procedures for changing
standards25 1 involve public hearings and support from the grain industry,
changes at the federal level are difficult to make. However, history has
demonstrated that state or local grade standards lead to inequities and
inefficiencies.252 The industry is best served by federal regulations that
establish uniform standards for use throughout the industry.
Export procedures for most U.S. grain are based on an export certif-
icate where origin quality and weight are final. 253 This means that the
sellers' responsibility ends when. the required weight and quality are
loaded in the final shipping bin in the export elevator above the vessel.
Changes that take place in the quality of the grain during loading, transit
or unloading at final destination become the responsibility of the buyer.
246 Multon & Martin, Mdthods de rfrences nornalisdes de dosage de l'eau dans le cas du mdfs:
Justification des methods ICC, REvUE DE METROLOGIC PRACTIQUE ET LEGALE 9 (1978).
247 FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, REPORT OF THE
SECOND SESSION OF THE CODEX COMMITTEE ON CEREALS AND CEREAL PRODUCTS 9, para. 54
(1981).
248 Paulsen, Hill & Dixon, Moisture Meter-to-Oven Comparisons for Illinois Corn, 26 TRANS-
ACTIONS OF THE AM. Soc. AGRIC. ENGINEERS 576-83 (1983).
249 L. Hill, Improved Quality of U.S. Feed Grain Exports (May 15, 1978) (paper presented at a
grain trade seminar in London).
250 Grits are segments of the hard endosperm of the corn kernel obtained during separation of
germ, bran, and endosperm in dry milling. Flaking grits are those grits large enough to be used for
making flakes such as those used in breakfast cereals.
251 7 U.S.C. §§ 71, 74 (1982).
252 Uniform Rules, supra note 181, at 549-50.
253 S. BERMINGHAM & L. HILL, supra note 211, at 1.
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However, at the foreign port, the vessel is frequently allocated among as
many as 50 different buyers with significant variation in the quality they
receive. 251 The importer's responsibility is so diffused that processors or
feeders cannot obtain accountability for quality changes during unload-
ing. The primary change that takes place after the grain is graded at the
export point is one of increased breakage during subsequent handling.25
Drying techniques and varieties of grain are available that would dramat-
ically reduce the amount of breakage taking place during this han-
dling.256 However, no incentives exist to reward those farmers who use
lower drying temperatures or select varieties that will better withstand
subsequent handling.257
The solution is to change incentives. Every firm in the marketing
channel, from farmer to final processor, responds to economic incentives
that currently exist. If a change is desired in marketing practices, the
rules which generate these economic incentives must be changed. For
example, breakage during transit could be reduced by including a test for
breakage susceptibility in federal grade standards to facilitate price differ-
entials at the point of first delivery. Farmers who are currently selecting
varieties and using drying techniques to produce corn suited to the ex-
port market (e.g., resistance to breakage) would receive a higher price per
bushel than those farmers producing corn not suitable for these purposes.
Quality characteristics such as starch content, yield of flaking grits or
measure of total digestible nutrients and protein, once incorporated in
the grade standards, would become the basis for price differentials gener-
ating the incentives for an increase in quality throughout the market
channel. Without such incentives, no change is likely to occur.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Resolution of the issues in grain quality and grading standards re-
quires a perspective beyond national legislation and regulation. Local,
national and international laws and regulations with moral as well as
legal enforcement interact in world grain markets to promote efficiency
or inefficiency. Individual firms make decisions based upon incentives.
Incentives are generally prescribed by marketing institutions and regula-
tions. Therefore, any improvement in efficiency requires changes in regu-
lations and government policies. Legislation and regulations developed
to solve specific problems are seldom evaluated for their effects upon in-
254 L. HILL, M. PAULSEN & M. EARLY, supra note 240, at 20.
255 Id. at 26.
256 Paulsen, Hill, White & Sprague, supra note 245, at 1830-36, 1841.
257 L. HILL, M. PAULSEN, T. MouNTs, A. HEAKIN & G. Lisr, CHANGES IN QUALITY OF
CORN AND SOYBEANS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND 14 (College of Agriculture, Uni-
versity of Illinois at Urbana-Charnpaign, Spec. Pub. No. 63, 1981).
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centives and marketing efficiency. Yet these relationships often deter-
mine total product and profits available for distribution among the
various participants in the production and marketing of goods.
Few regulatory changes will receive unanimous support from all
sectors of a national economy or from all nations because regulations are,
by their nature, intended to help balance the marketing power of one
group against that of others. Existing rules and regulations, as well as
potential additions or changes must be evaluated for indirect effects upon
the total available supply of goods and services as a consequence of their
role in creating incentives or disincentives in the market. There are very
few opportunities for decisions that make everyone better off without
making someone worse off in a welfare context.258 For the most part,
decisions of this type are spontaneously initiated by individual partici-
pants in the market. Most issues revolve around the trade-offs between
individuals and groups and resolution of the issues requires regulations
accompanied by legal enforcement. Changes in regulations often result
in a reallocation of the total income among firms, individuals or nations.
These changes can increase the total income, even though not all groups
will gain. If changes increase total income and are made under condi-
tions of economic growth, losers can be compensated to counter undesir-
able effects of redistribution. However, the rules of the game must be
properly structured to generate incentives for increased efficiency, greater
output and allocation of the total product according to socially accepta-
ble criteria.
Efficiency in grain production, marketing and international trade is
largely determined by the regulatory environment and enforcement cli-
mate within which private firms make marketing decisions. This article
has reviewed only a few of the numerous regulations affecting the grain
industry in order to illustrate the important influence of national and
international policies on the cost and availability of grain. In order to
avoid serious consequences in terms of adequacy, stability and cost of
food supplies, it is essential that agencies and individuals responsible for
developing, interpreting and enforcing local, national and international
regulations understand the economic implications of their decisions.
258 P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS 602 (1948).
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